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In recent years, a considerable body of literature has 
developed around the issue of intrinsic and extrinsic motiva­
tion. DeCharms (1968) attacked the notion of additivity .with 
respect to these processes and suggested that intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation may in fact be interactive. DeCharms' 
suggestion was that extrinsic reward may actually result in 
a decrease in intrinsic task interest. 
Empirical support for this notion has come from a number 
of experiments (e.g. Deci, 1971, 1972 ; Lepper, Greene S Nisbett, 
1973; Lepper 8 Greene, 1975). Several theories have been 
proposed to account for the effect. An information-processing 
model offered by Greene and Lepper (197 5) has incorporated a 
competing-response theory offered by Reiss and Sushinsky (1975a, 
1975b) and a self-perception theory offered by Bern (1967). 
Lepper and Greene's model suggests that reward may reduce 
intrinsic task interest in two ways. The theory suggests, 
firstly, that reward may reduce intrinsic motivation by directing 
attention away from important task subgoals and thereby result 
in poor task performance (a competing-response viewpoint). 
Secondly, Greene and Lepper argue that extrinsic reward may 
alter an individual's perception of the purpose or goal of his 
behavior. This may cause the individual to perceive his 
behavior as goal, rather than task oriented (a self-perception 
viewpoint). Lepper and Greene (19 75) suggest, however, that 
extrinsic reward may lead to increases in intrinsic motivation 
if reward directs attention toward task subgoals. Reward 
which is delivered contingent upon successful performance, 
may direct attention toward relevant task subgoals and may 
lead to the perception of competence in one's ability to 
perform. The importance of a self-perception of competency 
has been stressed by others (e.g., White, 1959 ; Maslow, 1954-, 
1955; and Seligman, 1975) and may be an important determinant" • 
of task interest. 
An experiment was conducted to evaluate the effects 
of contingent, noncontingent and no-reward procedures upon 
subsequent task interest. The variable of perceived competency 
was also manipulated by giving subjects false feedback as to 
the quality of their performance. In a 3 x 3 design, 90 subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of nine groups. In three reward 
conditions, subjects received monetary reward contingent upon 
successful performance during a decoding task. In three 
noncontingent-reward conditions, subjects received monetary 
reward for their involvement in the task but no performance 
requirements were made. Subjects in three no-reward conditions 
did not receive extrinsic reward during their task involve­
ment. The variable of competence was manipulated by informing 
subjects that their performance was either significantly 
above (high competence) or below (low competence) the norm 
or that their performance did not deviate from that of the 
average college student (average competence). 
Subjects were left alone in the experimental room for 
a 20-minute period following the treatment phase while the 
experimenter supposedly performed a computer analysis of the 
subjects' data. During this free choice period, subjects 
could have elected to either work on a decoding task similar 
to the one employed during the first part of the experiment 
or they could have elected to read a magazine available in 
the experimental room. 
The major dependent variables of interest were the 
number of' words and cartoons correctly decoded during the 
posttest decoding task. Other dependent variables of interest 
included responses to postexperimental questionnaire items. 
The results of the study indicated that there was a trend in 
which contingent reward resulted in a detrimental effect upon 
task interest as compared to a no-reward procedure. The effect 
of noncontingenty reward was less detrimental. The competency 
manipulation was found to have no effect upon subsequent task 
interest. The results were discussed in terms of the 
algorithmic nature of the decoding task. 
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In recent years, a considerable body of literature 
has developed around the issue of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. DeCharms (1968) attacked the notion of additivity 
with respect to these processes and suggested that intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation may in fact be interactive. Specifi­
cally, DeCharms suggested that when one perceives his 
behavior to be under the control of extrinsic reward, the 
result may actually be a decrease in intrinsic task interest. 
DeCharms attributed this interaction to the extrinsic 
reward's effect upon the individual's perceived locus of 
control. That is, he suggested that when an individual per­
forms an act for an external reward, he loses his feeling of 
"personal causality" and becomes a pawn to the reward. 
DeCharms argued that: 
Whenever a person experiences himself to be the locus 
of causality for his own behavior...he will consider 
himself to be intrinsically motivated. Conversely, 
when a person perceives the locus of causality for his 
behavior to be external to himself...he will consider 
himself to be extrinsically motivated. (p.328) 
As Ross (197 5) has pointed out, the existence of an 
actual dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
is a questionable notion. Skinner (1953) has argued that it is 
always possible to trace control for a behavior to a particular 
2 
environmental contingency for which the individual may or 
may not be aware. Some theorists, such as DeCharms, 
therefore have approached the problem from the standpoint of 
the perceived rather than the actual cause of behavior. A 
similar approach, taken also by Bern (1965, 1967) is consistent 
with Kelly's (1967) attribution theory and involves the study 
of the individual's perception of the causes of his own 
behavior. 
Bern's (1965, 1967) theory of self-perception assumes 
that individuals are taught by society to be observers of 
their own behavior. Consistent with Skinner's (195 7) analysis, 
Bern argues that an individual may perceive his behavior to 
be under the control of specific reinforcers ("mands") or 
under the control of his attitude statements or beliefs 
("tacts"). Thus, a child who receives a token for painting 
a picture will perceive the cause of his behavior as being 
the token, according to Bern. On the other hand, a child who 
paints without receiving payment will attribute the cause of 
his behavior to his dispositional attitude toward the task, 
i.e. he may infer that he painted "because he wanted to," 
or "because he enjoys it." 
The first empirical investigations of the DeCharms 
hypothesis were conducted by Deci (1971). In the first of 
these experiments, a pretest-posttest design was employed and 
subjects were asked to work on a Soma puzzle. This plastic 
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puzzle is made up of seven pieces which can be fitted 
together to form millions of configurations including a 
three-inch cube. Deci chose the Soma puzzle as a task item 
because of its apparent intrinsic interest to a college 
student population. Subjects were asked to reproduce three 
sets of four configurations. One group of subjects was 
rewarded with one dollar for each correct puzzle solution 
while another group was not rewarded. During a free operant 
posttest, rewarded subjects played with the puzzles for a 
significantly lesser amount of time than did non-rewarded 
subjects. In a second experiment, Deci attempted a field 
replication using as subjects • students who were headline 
writers for a college newspaper. Subjects in the experimental 
group, consisting of four students, were paid 50 cents for 
each headline written during a treatment phase. A control 
group also consisting of four students received no payment 
for their work. At the conclusion of the treatment phase, 
experimental subjects were informed that due to the shortage 
of funds they would no longer receive payment for their work. 
Results indicated that during a posttest phase, control sub­
jects wrote headlines significantly faster than experimental 
subjects. Also, experimental subjects were absent a signifi­
cantly greater number of times during the posttest phase than 
were control subjects. Deci interpreted these results as 
indicating that reward had reduced intrinsic motivation for 
headline writing in experimental subjects. 
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Finally, in a third experiment, Deci (19 71) attempted 
to replicate the findings of his first experiment using 
verbal praise in place of monetary incentive. In this study, 
subjects in an experimental group were given verbal feedback 
and praise contingent upon correct puzzle solutions while 
subjects in a control condition were not. Results indicated 
that during a free operant posttest, experimental subjects 
played with the Soma puzzles for a significantly greater 
amount of time (p^.10) than control subjects. 
In a later experiment, Deci (197 2) directly compared 
the effects of verbal and material reinforcement. In this 
experiment, subjects were presented either with monetary 
reward or with verbal encouragements for working on Soma 
puzzles. Deci predicted that intrinsic motivation would be 
decreased by material reward but would be increased by verbal 
reward. Deci reasoned that verbal reinforcement should lead 
to increases in intrinsic motivation because verbal rewards 
should not be "phenomenologically distinquishable" from 
internal satisfaction. The results of the experiment supported 
the prediction for material reward for both male and female 
subjects. The prediction for verbal reinforcement, however, 
was supported only for male subjects. The effect was not 
obtained for females because, according to Deci, a "very 
attractive and personable male graduate student" acted as 
experimenter. Interaction with the experimenter may have 
served to increase the intrinsic interest of females in the 
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no verbal reinforcement condition. Even though these 
females received no specific verbal reinforcement, they 
still may have experienced positive interpersonal reinforce­
ment. This reinforcement, according to Deci, increased 
their intrinsic motivation to a level equal to that of 
females and males in the verbal reinforcement conditions. 
Deci's (197 2) study confounded material and verbal 
reinforcement with the variable of expectancy. That is, 
material reward was expected beforehand while verbal reward 
was not. This might have caused behavior to be perceived 
as a mand in the former case and as a tact in the latter. 
A study by Lepper, Greene and Nisbett (197 3) points to the 
significance of the expectancy variable. The authors observed 
the behavior of children in a classroom through a one-way 
mirror during a free play period. A number of items were 
placed on a table and were available to the children. 
Included in these materials were the novel stimulus items, 
Magic Markers. During this baseline period, drawing with 
the crayons was found to be a highly probable behavior. 
Several weeks later, the experimenter removed the children 
from the classroom individually and escorted them to a small 
room where they were asked to draw some pictures. One 
group of children was told that they would be rewarded for 
drawing and each of these children was presented with a 
"good player award" at the conclusion of the treatment session. 
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A second group of children was given the award but was not 
informed about its presentation until after their drawings 
has been completed. For these children, the reward was 
unexpected. Finally, a third group did not expect and did 
not receive the reward. A posttest conducted three weeks 
after treatment indicated that subjects who expected the 
reward and were rewarded for drawing showed significant 
decreases in this behavior, whereas the other groups of 
children showed no such decrease. 
Lepper et al«(1973) noted that while the effect of 
reward upon a high probability behavior may be to reduce the 
subsequent probability that the behavior will be engaged in, 
the effect may not occur with low probability behaviors. 
Calder and Staw (197 5) tested this hypothesis. The authors 
asked subjects to work on either blank or picture puzzles 
for pay or for no pay. Subjects in the payment conditions 
received one dollar at the end of the experimental session. 
The reward was expected and contingent upon the completion 
of 15 five-piece puzzles. The interaction effect predicted 
by the authors was supported by the results of the study. 
Ratings of task enjoyment increased in the low intrinsic 
motivation (blank puzzle) condition with the introduction of 
monetary reward. However, in the high intrinsic motivation 
condition (picture puzzle), ratings of enjoyment decreased 
with the introduction of monetary payment. The data for 
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amount of time volunteered for future experiments paralleled 
the data for task enjoyment, but fell short of reaching 
conventional significance levels. The authors concluded that 
the initial probability of the behavior in question may be 
of crucial importance in predicting the effects of reward 
upon intrinsic motivation. 
Several aspects of the reward itself have been found 
to be of crucial importance in determining its effect upon 
intrinsic motivation. Kruglanski, Riter , Amital, Marzolin, 
Shablai and Zaksh (1975), for example, demonstrated that if 
a reward was intrinsic to the nature of the task, subjects' 
evaluations of the task would not be effected as they would 
when the reward was extrinsic to the task. The authors either 
paid or did not pay subjects for participating in a coin toss 
game or for building models with wooden blocks. In the 
money conditions, payment was contingent upon.correct guesses 
in the coin toss game and contingent upon correct constructions 
in the model-building task. The dependent variable was the 
subjects' ratings of the extent to which they enjoyed the 
games and would play them in the future. Results indicated 
that subjects in the money coin game condition gave higher 
ratings of the coin game than did subjects in the no-money 
coin game condition. On the other hand, subjects in the 
money model-building condition gave lower ratings of their task 
as compared to subjects who were not paid for building models. 
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In a second experiment, the authors rewarded or did 
not reward subjects for playing either a stock market or an 
athletics game. The findings of this experiment paralleled 
those of the first study with subjects' ratings being higher 
in the stock market game when money was present and highest 
in the athletics game when money was absent. 
Another variable of importance is the saliency of the 
reward. Ross (197 5) has pointed out that the reward in 
previous research has always been salient to the subject. 
Ross proposed that as reward saliency was increased, subjects 
would perceive their behavior as under the control of external 
stimuli (mands). As the mand elements of a task increase 
(and presumably the internal or tact elements consequently 
decrease), the individual will be less likely to engage in 
the behavior when the controlling mand elements are withdrawn. 
Ross conducted an experiment in which he placed a reward 
under an attractive box. The box was in plain view as 
subjects in a salient-reward group engaged in the task 
behavior (playing a drum). Reward was promised but not 
placed in view for subjects in a nonsalient-reward condition, 
and subjects in a control condition were neither promised nor 
given a reward. Results indicated that subjects in the 
salient-reward group subsequently played the drum for shorter 
periods of time as compared to subjects in the nonsalient-
reward and control conditions. In addition, a significantly 
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greater percentage of subjects in the nonsalient-reward 
and control conditions chose to play with the drum as the 
first toy during a free operant posttest period. Finally, 
a significantly greater number of subjects in the nonsalient-
reward and control conditions chose the drum as "the most 
fun toy". 
Ross proposed, in a second study, to investigate the 
hypothesis that the distracting properties of the reward were 
responsible for the subsequent decrease in the task behavior. 
Ross instructed one group of subjects to think about the 
reward (marshmallows) while engaging in the task. Another 
group of subjects in a distraction condition were instructed 
to think about the snow which was lying on the ground outside 
of the classroom. Subjects in a control condition were 
neither promised nor presented with the reward and subjects 
in a nonideation condition were promised the reward but were 
given no specific instructions regarding ideation. 
The results of the study revealed that control subjects 
played with the drum during a five-minute free play period 
for a significantly longer period than subjects in the think 
reward and nonideation conditions. The distraction condition 
also produced more drum play during the free play posttest 
than did the think-reward and nonideation conditions. Ross 
concluded that intrinsic interest in a task is most likely to 
wane when the task behavior is rewarded with a highly salient 
reinforcer. Ross further commented that the decrease in 
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intrinsic interest does not appear to be due to the distract­
ing properties of the reward since the think-snow subjects 
displayed greater subsequent interest in the task than did 
the think-reward subjects. Ross suggested that when the 
reward is a central focus of the subject's attention (i.e. 
when reward is salient) waiting for the reward may cause an 
aversive emotional state. The greater the anticipation of 
the reward, the greater is the aversiveness of the delay 
period before the reward's delivery. This delay of gratifi­
cation, according to Ross, leads to frustration which in 
turn becomes associated with the task, thereby making the task 
itself aversive. The result is a reduction in the probability that 
the- child will subsequently engage in the task. Ross derived 
this interpretation from a competing response hypothesis 
offered by Reiss and Sushinsky (1975a, 1975b). 
While Ross' theoretical interpretation is commensurate 
with the data of his experiment, the frustration hypothesis is 
not a parsimonious explanation of the results of a study by 
Lepper and Greene (1975). In this study, subjects either 
expected or did not expect to receive a reward (the opportunity 
to play with highly attractive toys) for working on a set of 
puzzles. In addition, the children in two experimental 
conditions were led to believe that their behavior was under 
either high or low surveillance. Subjects in a control 
condition were not informed concerning the surveillance of 
their behavior. 
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One to three weeks after the experimental manipulation, 
a free operant posttest was conducted. The results of the 
study indicated a significant main effect for both reward and 
for surveillance. Subjects who expected reward and were 
rewarded and subjects who were under "high surveillance" 
showed subsequent decreases in the amount of time spent working 
on puzzles. 
The authors have explained the results of their study 
in terms of Bern's self-perception theory. This explanation 
parsimoniously accounts for both main effects. That is, 
subjects in both the expected reward and surveillance condi­
tions perceived their behavior as being under the control of 
external factors (reward or adult surveillance). Therefore, 
when these pressures were removed, a decrease in task behavior 
resulted. 
Considering the findings from the standpoint of Ross' 
frustration hypothesis, the main effect of reward expectancy 
was predictable. That is, subjects who expected reward 
played with the puzzles for significantly lesser periods of 
time during the posttest because the task had taken on an 
aversive quality via its pairing with an aversive delay 
period. The frustration hypothesis does not appear to account, 
however, for the finding that subjects who were under high 
and low surveillance showed a subsequent decrease in interest 
for the puzzle task. These subjects played with the puzzles 
for a significantly lesser percentage of time during the post-
test when compared to subjects in the nonsurveillance condition. 
Surveillance in the Lepper and Greene (1975) study was 
carried out supposedly by a TV camera. If surveillance of 
this sort was perceived as a reward by the children in the 
Lepper and Greene study, then the reward was simultaneous 
with the behavior. That is, there was no delay of gratification 
and therefore no frustration should have occurred. A subse­
quent decrease in task behavior was noted for these subjects, 
however. If TV surveillance was perceived to be aversive, 
the reduction in subsequent interest in the task may have 
been the direct result of the task's association with an 
aversive event. In this case, the need for the intervening 
construct of frustration dissappears. 
Theoretical Accounts of the Decreased Play Effect 
Several models have been proposed to account for the 
effect of reward upon subsequent task interest. The 
theoretical explanation offered by Reiss and Sushinsky 
(1975a, 1975b) is actually more expansive than has been 
described by Ross. Reiss and Sushinsky have suggested that a 
reward may elicit behaviors which are incompatible with the. 
task. According to Reiss and Sushinsky's competing response 
hypothesis, a negative emotional state is created to the 
extent that task and reward-elicited behaviors are incompatible. 
The authors note that exposure to a salient reward may elicit 
many responses which can interfere with task behavior. Task 
behavior might be disrupted by perceptual distraction, 
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cognitive distraction (e.g. thinking about reward), excite­
ment in anticipation of reward or frustration from delay or 
withdrawal of reward (Reiss S Sushinsky, 1975a). The authors 
argue that this temporary emotional state created by the 
conflict between task-and-reward-elicited behaviors will 
normally decrease with multiple presentations of the reward", 
however, a relatively long-lasting decrement in performance 
may occur under some conditions. The competing response 
hypothesis suggests a second process whereby the negative 
emotional state created by the competing responses is paired 
with the task. The task, thereby, takes on aversive 
properties via Pavlovian conditioning. The permanence of 
the effect is determined by the extent of the conditioning. 
Reiss and Sushinsky C1975a) have suggested that the 
decreased play effects obtained in most of the previous 
research was due to the temporary distracting effects of the 
reward. The authors argued thatjwith multiple presentations 
of the reward, habituation occurs, competing emotional 
responses dissipate^and the decreased play effect vanishes. 
In order to test this hypothesis, a study was conducted in 
which nine children were rewarded on a multiple basis for 
listening to one of three Christmas songs. Subjects were 
rewarded on a variable interval schedule with tokens which 
they could later exchange for one of several attractive toys. 
Forty-eight hours following training? a 10-minute posttest was 
conducted. Results revealed that children spent, on the 
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average, more than twice as much time listening to the 
target song than to the next preferred non-target song. 
An interpretation of the Ross (197 5) study in terms 
of the competing response hypothesis would suggest that in 
the expected reward condition, the "think snow" manipulation 
eliminated the decreased play effect because it interfered 
with the subjects ability to "think reward". Distracting 
the subjects' attention away from the reward prevented, accord­
ing to Reiss and Sushinsky (1975b), the occurrence of 
competing responses elicited by the aversive emotional state 
associated with the delay of reward. The competing response 
hypothesis, however, might also predict that subjects in the 
think snow-nonexpected reward condition would also show 
decrements in subsequent play behavior. This would seem to 
be true unless thinking about snow elicits responses which 
are less distracting and less incompatible with the task than 
does thinking about reward. Reiss and Sushinsky (19 7 5b, p.9) 
have, in fact, suggested that "...the think-snow instruction 
alone did not produce decreased play effects because, unlike 
think-reward, it does not elicit affective competing responses 
(frustration)". While this appears to be a reasonable argument, 
it points out that one of the difficulties v/ith the competing 
response hypothesis is that it is difficult to disconfirm. 
That is, in the face of seemingly incongruous data one can 
easily argue that the experimental operation was insufficient 
to produce a competing response. 
15 
Another difficulty with the competing response hypothesis 
is that it cannot deal with the data from a study by Weiner 
and Mander (1975). These authors asked one group of subjects 
to solve word anagrams for which they would receive electric 
shock on a fixed ratio schedule. Subjects in a threat of 
shock condition were told to expect but never actually received 
shock. Finally, control subjects did not expect nor receive 
shock. During a free choice posttest period, subjects in the 
shock condition solved significantly more anagrams from a 
second list than did no-shock subjects. Furthermore 7 7% 
of the subjects in the shock group increased in the number of 
anagrams solved from pretest to posttest while 77% of the no-
shock subjects decreased in the number of anagrams solved. 
The authors interpreted the results of the study in terms of 
self-perception theory. That is, when a behavior is engaged 
in with the expectancy that an aversive consequence will 
follow, the individual will perceive his behavior as a tact. 
The frequency of the behavior, therefore, will increase when 
the aversive consequence is withdrawn. 
According to the competing response hypothesis, shock 
should have elicited emotional responses incompatible with 
solving anagrams. Shock elicited emotion'al responses should 
have increased the aversiveness of the situation. The task 
should then have taken on an aversive quality via its pairing 
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with a negative emotional state. The result should have been 
a decrease in the task behavior during the posttest. An 
increase in the task behavior, however, was indicated by the 
results of the study. 
Greene and Lepper (19 75) have offered an information-
processing theory to explain the decreased play effect. 
These authors suggest that rewarding an intrinsically inter­
esting behavior may result both in a decrease in subsequent 
interest in the task and in a decrease in the quality of 
performance. Two programs are offered to explain these 
effects. 
The choose program is concerned with the processes 
invdlved in determining the way in which one selects a 
particular activity. At any given time, a number of alterna­
tive behaviors are available to an individual. According 
to Greene and Lepper, each of these behaviors has associated 
with it intrinsic and extrinsic factors represented in memory 
and an individual chooses an activity so that the net incentive 
is maximised. When a reward is withdrawn, the probability 
that a behavior will be engaged in depends on the sum of 
intrinsic factors. Intrinsic and extrinsic factors are 
assumed to be additive up until a point of reward saliency after 
which they become interactive. The intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors associated with each activity in memory are continuously 
updated with intrinsic and extrinsic values changing according 
to experience. 
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The engage program is responsible for the way in which 
the task is performed. Engage receives direct input from 
the choose program which determines the exit or stop point 
for engage. If an activity is engaged in for reward then 
the program exits when the reward is received. 
Subgoals of the engage program are also determined by 
the choose program. A subgoal such as "which color to 
add next to a picture", is determined by whether the task is 
engaged in for extrinsic or for intrinsic factors. If a 
person is drawing in order to earn a reward, the selection 
of which color to add next will be determined by information 
about which color the external judge (who is offering the 
reward) thinks should be added. The goals of the judge may 
be too ridgid or conversely, they may be too ambiguous. 
Either of these cases may lead to a less desirable state when 
compared to a si-tuation in which the artist determines the 
subgoals and may experiment and redefine goals according to his 
own criterion. 
Greene and Lepper point out that working on a task for 
external reward reduces the possibility that the individual 
will be aware of the subtle aspects of the task. This is 
said to be true because when external reward is involved, 
attention is directed toward a different set of subgoals 
than the ones encountered when a task is engaged in for its 
own inherent rewards. In this manner, the theory addresses 
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the problem of the distractibility of rewards. The theory 
explains the Kruglanski et al.(1975) findings, therefore, 
by suggesting that rewards which are inherent in the nature 
of a task, direct attention toward the subgoals necessary for 
good performance on that task. On the other hand, rewards 
not inherent in the nature of the task, presumably distract 
one's attention from the task and encourage focus on another 
set of subgoals. 
The Greene and Lepper theory suggests, therefore, that 
reward may reduce interest in a task in two ways. First, 
extrinsic reward may alter the goal of an individual's behavior 
in such a way that the stop or exit point is the reward 
rather than the successful completion of the task. This may 
effect the way in which the individual perceives his own 
behavior (i.e., as a mand rather than as a tact). Second, 
reward may distract an individual's attention away from the 
subgoals and rewards intrinsic to the task itself. 
The discussion thus far has suggested that there 
exists some important differences between Greene and Lepper's 
information-processing model and Reiss and Sushinski's 
competing-response hypothesis. A comparison between these two 
theories reveals that the models differ in their major area 
of focus. The competing-response hypothesis accounts for the 
direction and patterning of behavior in terms of the compati­
bility or incompatibility between responses. According to 
19 
the competing-response hypothesis, the directionality of behavior 
is determined to a large extent by the behavior which precedes 
it; i.e., behavior is determined by its antecedents. The 
information-processing hypothesis on the other hand accounts 
for the direction and patterning of behavior partially in 
terms of terminal goals or consequences. 
There is, however, a sense in which the two theories are 
identical. Greene and Lepper's hypothesis suggests that one 
of the ways in which reward may be detrimental is if it 
distracts an individual from the subgoals and rewards intrinsic 
to the task. This is equivalent to saying that reward-
oriented behaviors are competing with task-oriented behaviors. 
Greene and Lepper, therefore, have actually contained a 
competing-response hypothesis within their information-
processing model. The same criticisms which were lodged 
against the competing-response hypothesis are, of course, 
applicable to this portion of the Greene and Lepper model. 
However, Greene and Lepper have begun to construct a model 
which is more inclusive than the Reiss and Sushinski hypothe­
sis in that, as previously noted, they have also called 
attention to the importance of "goals" or the expected conse­
quences of behavior. 
The Importance of Perceived Competence 
Part of the basic appeal of the information-processing 
model is that it views man as an active information-seeking 
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system. Inherent in this view is the idea that man has 
a tendency to collect, analyze and organize information. 
He goes about this often in a way which appears to be 
independent of other goals. That is, oftentimes information 
appears to be its own reward. Skinner (195 3) has observed 
that: 
Some forms of stimulation are positively reinforcing 
although they do not appear to elicit behavior having 
biological significance. A baby is reinforced, not 
only by food, but by the tinkle of a bell or the 
sparkle of a bright object. Behavior which is consis­
tently followed by such stimuli shows an increase in 
probability. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
trace these reinforcing effects to a history of con­
ditioning. ..we may plausibly argue that a capacity to 
be reinforced by any feedback from the environment 
would be biologically advantageous, since it would 
prepare the organism to manipulate the environment 
successfully before a given state of deprivation 
developed, (p. 83) 
Several theorists have conceptualized this phenomenon 
in terms of a drive for mastery or competence. White (19 59) 
has discussed the prominence of the concept of competence in the 
literature. He has discussed the view of Freud whofcj is 
reported to have said that "the task of the nervous system is— 
broadly speaking—to master stimuli" and the view of Hendrick 
who proposed an "instinct to master". In addition, the 
theories of Goldstein (194-0) and of Maslow (1954-, 1955) have 
stressed a tendency towards "self-actualization". Others, 
e.g. Gro(§s (1901) and Piaget (1952), have remarked upon the 
facination shown by infants and children for behaviors which 
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have an effect upon their environment. White has summarized 
this viewpoint by noting: 
...it is clear that the child or animal is by no means 
at the mercy of transient stimulus fields. He selects 
for continuous treatment those aspects of his environ­
ment which he finds it possible to effect in some way. 
His behavior is selective, directed, persistent—in 
short, motivated. (1959, p.320) 
The importance of an individual's "controllability" over 
his environment has also been stressed by Seligman (1975). Sel-
igman has proposed a theory of "learned helplessness" to 
account for anxiety and depression. The cornerstone of his 
theory is the proposition that an animal or person can learn 
not only that his behavior leads to certain consequences, but 
also that his behavior is independent of certain other conse­
quences. According to Seligman, a psychological state of 
anxiety and depression frequently results when an individual 
believes that the events in his environment are uncontrollable, 
i.e., independent of his responding. Support for Seligman's 
theory comes from a series of laboratory investigations in which 
one group of dogs are restrained in a Pavlovian classical con­
ditioning hammock and subjected to unavoidable shocks. Following 
this procedure, the experimental dogs were placed in a two com­
partment chamber. The dogs could avoid or escape shock in this 
chamber by jumping over a barrier from a shock compartment to a 
safe compartment. This is a relatively easy task for a dog to 
learn and Seligman's naive control animals learned to jump 
the barrier in approximately 50 trials. In contrast, however, dogs 
who had been initially subjected to uncontrollable shock 
were unable to learn the escape or the avoidance response. 
In other experiments, Seligman (1975) has compared groups 
of dogs who could control shock with yoked control dogs who 
were subjected to uncontrollable shock. In these experiments, 
similar results were found. The yoked animals who were exposed 
to uncontrollable shock were subsequently unable to learn an 
escape response. In comparison, animals who were able to 
terminate shock with a bar press and animals who received no 
shock were able to learn the escape response in a normal 
fashion. Seligman concluded that helplessness appears to 
be related to controllability rather than merely to the 
"trauma of shock" per se. 
Seligman (19 75) also reports on experiments demonstrating 
learned-helplessness effects in rats, primates and in man. 
In an experiment conducted by Glass and Singer (1972), sub­
jects listened to a loud melange of sound. The study was 
one of a series designed to evaluate the role of stress upon 
performance. One group of subjects was able to turn off the 
noise by pushing a button. A yoked control group was exposed 
to the same noise presentation but was unable to control the 
offset of noise. A third group was also "uncontrollable" 
but these subjects were given a "panic button" and told 
"You can terminate the noise by pressing the button. But 
we'd prefer you not do it." These subjects had the false belief 
that they could control the noise if they had to. Results 
indicated that these perceived-control subjects performed as 
well as actual control subjects on a problem-solving task. 
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Subjects in the uncontrollable shock condition who did not 
have access to the "panic button" yielded the poorest per­
formance. The authors concluded that the expectation of 
controllability per se is a crucial determinant of helpless­
ness. It should be noted that Bern's self-perception theory 
would account for this finding in terms of differences in the 
inferences perceived-control and no-perceived-control 
subjects make about their behavior. Perceived-control sub­
jects were given the choice of terminating the noise but 
did not exercise this choice. Therefore, they may have 
inferred that the noise was not extremely noxious. In support 
of this hypothesis, the authors noted that perceived-control 
subjects rated the noise as less irritating and less dis­
tracting as compared to no-perceived-control subjects. 
However, later experiments (Mayhew, 1969; Glass, Reim and 
Singer, 1971) have failed to corroborate these findings. Glass 
et al„ has concluded that self-perception and dissonance 
theories do not offer a viable explanation of the data. 
In summary, there has been a great deal of speculation 
and some experimental support for the notion that effective 
interaction with one's environment is of crucial importance 
from a motivational point of view. Seligman (1975) has 
expressed the opinion that: 
For voluntary responding to occur, an incentive must 
be present in the form of an expectation that respond­
ing may succeed. In the absence of such an expecta­
tion, that is, when an organism believes responding is 
futile, voluntary responding will not occur, (p. 50) 
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Along a similar vein, Greene and Lepper (1975) have 
noted the importance of an individual's self-perception of 
competence. These authors have suggested that reward may 
not always have a detrimental effect upon task interest. 
They have noted that: 
...extrinsic rewards will not necessarily decrease 
intrinsic motivation. In fact, if they are used in 
such a way as to convey to a person that he or she 
has been successful, particularly in a socially 
comparative sense, and that he or she is personally 
responsible for the success, the result should be 
an increase in intrinsic motivation, (p. 15) 
The authors conclude that the effect of extrinsic rewards 
depends not only on the extent to which rewards produce the 
self-perception of extrinsic motivation, but also on the 
extent to which rewards convey to an individual information 
concerning his competence for the task. 
Statement of the Problem 
During the course of the present disscussion, the 
variables of reward and task competency have been highlighted 
as being of significance in determining an individual's 
motivation for a task. In review, Greene and Lepper have 
suggested that reward may reduce task interest in two ways. 
First, extrinsic reward may alter the goal of an individual's 
behavior. That is, when reward is administered, the stop or 
exit point becomes the reward rather than the successful 
completion of the task. This may affect the way in which 
one perceives the cause of his own behavior. Second, reward 
may distract an individual's attention away from the subgoals 
and rewards intrinsic to the task. 
Greene and Lepper's (1975) theory, therefore, would 
seem to suggest that if extrinsic reward directs attention 
to the subgoals necessary for successful performance of a 
task, intrinsic interest in the task should increase. Reward 
may direct attention towards task subgoals when it is deli­
vered contingently upon successful completion of sub-units 
of the task. The extent to which reward provides information 
concerning successful task strategies and the extent to 
which reward directs attention toward salient elements of 
the task should determine the effect reward will have upon 
subsequent task interest. 
On the other hand, self-perception theory would predict 
that"contingent reward may call attention to the fact that 
one's behavior is under the control of a specific reinforcer. 
Therefore, contingent reward may make the mand characteristics 
of the situation more salient and therefore lead to greater 
subsequent decreases in task behavior as compared to non-
contingent reward procedures. 
In past research, reward has sometimes been delivered 
contingent upon successful performance (e.g., Deci, 1971, 1972 
Calder S Staw, 19 75 ; Kruglanski _ et al., 197 5) and has some­
times been delivered contingent upon subject involvement 
without a performance requirement (e.g., Lepper, Greene S 
Nisbett, 1973; Ross, 1975). The previous discussion would 
suggest that these two approaches may yield different results. 
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reward and perception of task competency, were manipulated 
separately in an attempt to determine their individual and 
combined effects upon subsequent task interest. 
In a 3 x 3 factorial design, 90 subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of nine groups. During a treatment phase, 
the subjects in three contingent-reward conditions earned 
monetary reward contingent upon successful performance during 
a cartoon-decoding task. In three noncontingent-reward condi­
tions, subjects earned monetary reward for simple task 
involvement. No performance requirement was made for these 
subjects. Subj.ects in three no-reward conditions earned no 
extrinsic reward during their task involvement. The variable 
of competence was manipulated by informing subjects that 
their performance was either above (high-competence) or below 
(low-competence) the norm or that their performance did not 
deviate from the average performance of college students 
(average competence). 
Subjects were left alone in the experimental room for a 
20-minute period following the treatment phase while the 
experimenter supposedly performed a detailed computer analysis 
of the subject's data. During this free choice period, 
subjects elected to either work on a decoding task similar to 
the one employed during the treatment phase of the experiment 
or they chose to read a recent issue of Psychology Today which 
was available in the experimental room. 
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As rioted above, contingent and noncontingent reward may 
result in different attentional behaviors and/or may differ 
in the ways in which they affect a subject's perceptions of 
his own behavior. To date, a direct comparison between these 
two methods has not been made. 
Based upon the previous literature review, it would 
also seem that an individual's perception of his ability for 
a task should affect his interest in that activity. The 
discussion would suggest that as one's self-perception of 
competency increases, so should one's interest in the task. 
It is also possible, however, that one might be "challenged" 
by low competency for a task. White (1959) has suggested 
that interest is not aroused by a familiar stimulus field 
but rather that a certain amount of novelty or optimal 
stimulation is necessary to maintain task involvement. It 
may be, therefore, that under some conditions a certain degree 
of "perceived incompetence" may result in greater task 
interest. The function may be an inverted U in which task 
interest drops off under conditions of extremely low or 
extremely high perceptions of ability. 
The variables of reward and competency may interact 
such that the detrimental effects of reward may be offset by 
the conditions of competency which yield high subsequent task 
interest. In an experiment described below, the variables, 
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The major dependent variables of interest were the 
number of words and the number of cartoons correctly decoded 
during the posttest. 
The hypotheses tested were the following: 
1) Based upon self-perception theory, it was predicted that 
contingent-reward would focus attention upon the fact that 
an individual's behavior was under the control of reward. 
It was hypothesized that this perception would be less pronounced 
under conditions of noncontingent-reward and least pronounced 
under conditions of no-reward. Contingent-reward therefore, 
was expected to have the most detrimental effect upon sub­
sequent task interest. Noncontingent-reward was expected to 
have a less detrimental effect and no-reward was expected 
to have the least detrimental effect upon task interest. 
Specifically, it was predicted that there would be a signifi­
cant main effect for reward with subjects in the no-reward 
groups decoding a significantly greater number of words and 
cartoons during the posttest than contingent-and noncontingent-
reward subjects. It was also predicted that no-reward sub­
jects would spend significantly more time (according to the 
subjects' estimates) working on the posttest decoding task 
as compared to subjects in the contingent and noncontingent-
reward groups. In addition, it was predicted that subjects 
in the noncontingent-reward groups would solve a significantly 
greater number of encoded words and cartoons and would spend 
significantly more time working on the posttest decoding task 
as compared to subjects in the contingent-reward groups. 
2) Lepper and Greene (19 75) have suggested that an indivi­
dual's perception of his task competency may effect his 
intrinsic interest in the activity. Based upon this hypothe­
sis, it was predicted that subsequent task interest would 
be a direct function of the degree to which subjects per­
ceived themselves to be competent at the decoding task. 
Specifically, it was predicted that there would be a main 
effect for competence with high-competence subjects solving a 
significantly greater number of words and cartoons during the 
posttest than average-or low-competence subjects. In addition, 
it was predicted that high-competence subjects would spend 
significantly more time working on the posttest task than 
would average-competence or low-competence subjects. Also, 
it was hypothesized that average-competence subjects would 
solve a significantly greater number of words and cartoons 
and would spend significantly more time working on the post-
test as compared to low-competence subjects. 
3) It was predicted that the effects of reward and competency 
would interact in complex fashion. Specifically, it was pre­
dicted that there would be a significant interaction effect 
between the variables of competency and reward such that 
the detrimental effects of contingent reward will be offset by 
the perception of high-competency and the beneficial effects 
of no-reward will be offset by the perception of low-competency. 
That is, it was predicted that there would be no significant 
difference between contingent-reward, non-contingent-reward 
and no-reward subjects in the high-competency condition. In 
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addition, it was predicted that there would be no signifi­
cant difference between contingent-reward, noncontingent-




Subjects and Experimenters 
Ninety female students were recruited for the study 
from a subject pool at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. Participation was in partial fullfillment of 
a course requirement in introductory psychology. The 
subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental condi­
tions . 
The experimenters included two female psychology 
graduate assistants and two female advanced undergraduate 
psychology majors enrolled in an independent studies project. 
Experimental Setting and Materials 
The experiment was conducted in an 8' x 10 1 room 
lighted by an overhead florescent lamp. The subject was seated 
across from the experimenter at a table on which was placed 
two booklets, each containing 12 cartoons' several pads of 
note paper and a stack of answer sheets. 
The cartoons were ones selected from Playboy magazine 
and were pretested for their humorous quality. One hundred 
cartoons were presented to 2 0 undergraduate and graduate 
females who were asked to rate them on a scale of one to 10, 
one being "very unfunny" and 10 being "very funny". The 
24- cartoons with the highest mean ratings were selected 
for use in the study. The cartoons were assigned to one of 
two collections such that the mean ratings for each collection 
did not differ significantly. The means for each group of 
cartoons were 5.32 and 5.34 (t<l). 
Each cartoon caption was in coded form and each subject 
was provided with a code key which described and gave examples 
of three codes (see Appendix A). One of the codes has been 
previously described by Shaw (1973). The words of each 
caption were divided into three groups and each group was 
coded in a different fashion. Each caption could be completely 
decoded, therefore, only by using the three different code 
systems. Each collection of 12 cartoons was arranged in three 
groups of four cartoons. Each cartoon was placed on a 
separate 3 1/2" x 11" sheet of paper and subjects were pro­
vided with an answer sheet on which to record their responses 
(see Appendix B). Within each group, the codes were employed 
in a systematic order. For example, the cartoons of one 
collection were encoded such that within each group of four 
cartoons the particular code sequence employed for cartoon 
one was reversed for cartoon 2, reversed back to the original 
sequence for cartoon three, and reversed again for cartoon 
four. Once a subject learned the reversal pattern, therefore, 
she needed only to discover the order of the codes for 
cartoon one and she was able to predict the order for the 
remaining cartoons in that group. The codes were designated 
by the numbers 1, 2 and 3 and the following code sequences 
were employed: 

















































Subjects were escorted into the experimental room and 
seated in front of the task materials. All subjects were 
instructed that they would be participating in a preliminary 
investigation designed "...to evaluate the appropriateness of 
a decoding task for use in future experimentation". The three 
coding methods were introduced at this point and subjects 
were informed that they would be required to decode the 
captions for a series of cartoons. Subjects were informed to 
attend to the sequence in which the codes were used within 
each caption and within each group and they were encouraged 
to attempt to discover the systematic principle underlying 
the code orders. It was pointed out that the discovery of 
this principle would aid them in breaking the codes more 
quickly than was possible using a simple trial and error 
procedure. The use of a systematic code sequence which the 
subjects might decipher was used in order to increase the 
complexity of the task and therefore increase practice effects. 
At this point, subjects were informed that some of the 
cartoons dealt with material of a sexual nature. Subjects 
were told that if they objected to viewing this material, 
they could choose to withdraw from the study without losing 
their experimental credit. Two subjects withdrew from the 
study at this point and they were replaced by two other 
randomly selected subjects. The experimenter presented a 
sample cartoon to the subjects who agreed to continue, in 
order to make certain that the subjects understood the task. 
Complete task instructions are given in Appendix C. 
After the sample cartoon was presented, and when it was 
clear that the subject understood the task, the subject was 
instructed that she would be working on one of two other 
collections of cartoons. The particular collection was supposedly 
determined randomly by having the subject select one of two slips 
of paper. Actually, both slips of paper read "collection 1" 
and that collection was therefore always selected for use 
during the treatment phase of the experiment. 
After the subject had selected the task materials, 
contingent-reward subjects were informed that they would 
receive five cents for each group of words successfully de­
coded within each cartoon. It was explained that they might 
therefore, receive as much as 15 cents for each cartoon 
successfully decoded. Subjects were asked to read each 
group of words to the experimenter after they had been 
decoded. If the subject's response was correct, the experi­
menter informed the subject as to the amount that she had 
earned up until that point. The monetary incentive, however, 
was not actually given to the subject until the conclusion 
of the experimental session. Noncontingent-reward subjects 
were also informed that they would receive monetary incentives" 
however, they were told that they would earn money "for your 
continued involvement in the task". These subjects earned 
payment according to the amount of money earned by the 
previously run contingent-reward subject. Noncontingent-
reward subjects were not required to meet a performance 
requirement in order to earn their reward. Once again, 
actual payment was not given until the conclusion of the 
experimental session. No-reward subjects did not receive 
payment and no mention was made of monetary incentive for 
these subjects. 
Actual monetary payment was witheld until the conclusion 
of the experimental session because of a finding by Deci (1972). 
In Deci's (1972) study, subjects were either rewarded before 
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or after a free choice posttest period. Results indicated 
that subjects who were paid after the posttest, demonstrated 
the decreased play effect. In contrast, subjects who were 
paid before the posttest actually showed an increase in task 
involvement during the posttest. Deci interpreted the 
results of his study in terms of inequity theory? i.e.; he 
suggested that subjects may have yielded the posttest increase 
in task behavior because they felt overcompensated for their 
efforts. 
All subjects were given 2 0 minutes to complete the 
treatment-decoding task. At the conclusion of the task, the 
competency manipulation took place. After counting the 
number of cartoons decoded, the experimenter remarked that 
the subject's overall performance was either considerably 
lower than (for low-competence subjects) or higher than (for 
high-competence subjects) or did not differ from (for average 
competence subjects) the performance of average college students. 
After the experimenter informed the subject as to the 
quality of her performance, she explained that it was 
necessary for her to leave the room for about 2 0 minutes in 
order to feed the subject's data into the computer (a computer 
terminal was located down the hall from the laboratory) so 
that she could compare the subject's performance times on 
individual cartoons with the performance times of a norm 
group. Subjects were instructed that during the time of the 
experimenter's absence, they could amuse themselves as they 
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wished. In a casual fashion, the experimenter pointed out 
that a recent issue of Psychology Today (April, 1976) was 
available for the subject's use or that the subject might 
decode cartoons from collection two if she so chose. 
Several subjects brought books into the laboratory with 
them and reported reading these during the posttest. The 
only restriction placed upon subjects was that they not leave 
the experimental room. 
The experimenter left the laboratory for 2 0 minutes. 
Upon returning, she questioned the subject regarding the 
cartoons of collection two, recording the total number of 
words and the total number of cartoons correctly decoded from 
this collection. Two post-experimental questionnaires were 
also administered. 
One of the questionnaires administered was the state 
anxiety subscale of Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene's (1968) 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Appendix D). This subscale has 
considerable face validity as an index of mood change. The 
scale was administered as a check on the arousal level of 
subjects. If the detrimental effects of reward were due to a 
temporary emotional reaction, this might be reflected in the 
state anxiety scores of reward subjects. 
On a second questionnaire (Appendix subjects were 
asked to rate, on a 10-point scale, the extent to which they 
found the task enjoyable, the amount of time they spent 
working on collection 2 during the posttest, and how likely 
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they would be to volunteer for a similar experiment in the 
future. They were also asked to rate their ability for the task 
and to answer several open-ended questions to reveal any 
suspicions they held and to reveal prior knowledge they may 
have had of the experimental procedure. Two subjects were 
eliminated from the experiment because they guessed one of 
the experimental hypotheses and one subject was eliminated 
because of suspiciousness of the experimental procedure. One 
additional subject was eliminated because she failed to 
complete one of the post-experimental questionnaires. Each 
of these subjects was replaced by another who was randomly 
selected from the subject pool. 
Finally, the subject was debriefed. The experimenter 
explained the true nature of the study and the necessity for 
the subject not to reveal the procedure to potential subjects. 
Contingent-and noncontingent-reward subjects were paid and 
all subjects were given experimental credit slips before 
leaving. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design was defined by the two between-
subject variables, competency and reward. Three levels of 
competency (low, average and high) were crossed with three 
levels of reward (no-reward, contingent-reward and noncontin­
gent-reward) resulting in a 3 x 3 factorial design. The 
independent variables are described below. 
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Reward. One third of the subjects received reward 
contingent upon their successful performance on the decoding 
task. Before the start of the treatment phase, these 
subjects were instructed that: 
In order to provide incentive for good performance, 
you will earn five cents each time you correctly 
decode a group of words. If you successfully decode 
all three groups within a cartoon, you will earn a 
total of 15 cents for that cartoon. Each time you 
have decoded.a group of words, read that portion of 
the caption to me and I will tell you if it is correct. 
If you correctly decode all three groups of cartoons, 
you will earn a total of $1.80. This money will be 
given to you at the end of the experimental session 
and will be yours to keep. You will have 2 0 minutes 
to complete the task. Do you have any questions be­
fore we begin?" 
Subjects in the noncontingent-reward condition were 
given the following instructions: 
In order to provide incentive for good performance, 
you will earn $ (amount determined by the 
previously run contingent-reward subject) for your 
continued involvement in the task. This money will 
be given to you at the end of the experimental session 
and will be yours to keep. You will have 20 minutes 
to complete the task. Do you have any questions before 
we begin?1 
Contingent-reward subjects were kept informed as to the 
cumulative amount of their earnings. Each time the subject 
earned five cents, the experimenter stated "you have now 
earned a total of $ (amount of money earned)". 
No-reward subjects were simply informed that they had 
20 minutes to complete the task. The experimenter answered 
any questions subjects had before beginning treatment. 
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Competency. As previously explained, subjects were 
informed as to the supposed quality of their performance. 
Following the treatment phase, the experimenter examined the 
subjects' answer sheets, counted up the number of words 
correctly decoded and remarked "you have correctly decoded 
(number of words) in (amount of time required) minutes. Your 
performance: 
is considerably lower than the average college students' 
(for low-competence subjects); 
is considerably higher than the average college students' 
(for high-competence subjects); or, 





The major dependent variables under study were the 
number of words and the number of cartoons successfully 
decoded during the posttest. These variables are related 
and, although both were included in the analysis, the 
number of words decoded was the more sensitive measure of 
the two. The reason for this is that no credit was given 
for partially correct cartoons when the number of decoded 
cartoons was calculated. Therefore, if a subject decoded 
a portion of the words within a cartoon and left the remainder 
in encoded form, she received no credit for her successful 
words. On the other hand, correctly decoded portions were 
credited when the number of correctly decoded words was 
calculated. Another reason why the dependent variable, number 
of correctly decoded words, was a more sensitive measure of 
performance, is because some cartoons contained more words 
than others. 
The dependent variable, number of decoded cartoons, was 
included for analysis because it was felt that once a subject 
correctly decoded a portion of a particular cartoon, it might 
be possible for her to guess the remaining words. Under 
these conditions, the number of correctly decoded cartoons 
might be a more appropriate measure. 
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Other dependent variables under study included: 
1) subjects' responses on the state anxiety portion of 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; 2) subjects' ratings of 
the extent to which they found working on the decoding 
task pleasant or enjoyable; 3) subjects' ratings of the 
amount of time they spent working on the decoding task during 
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the posttest; 4) subjects' ratings of their ability for the 
decoding task; 5) subjects' ratings of the extent to which 
they found the cartoons humorous; and, 6) subjects' ratings 
of how likely they would be to volunteer for a similar 
experiment in the future. Subjects' ratings on the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory were on a four-point scale and their 
ratings on the remaining questionnaire items were on a 10-
point scale. 
Analyses of variance were computed for the number of 
words and for the number of cartoons correctly decoded during 
the treatment phase of the experiment. The results of these 
analyses, given in Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix F), indicated no 
significant differences between groups as a function of the 
experimental manipulations. 
The mean number of words and the mean number of cartoons 
correctly decoded during the posttest were calculated as a 
function of reward and competency and are given in Tables 3 
and 4 (Appendix F). Because of the nature of the experiment, 
there were a large number of zero scores' i.e.; many subjects 
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chose not to work on the cartoons during the posttest. For 
this reason, the distribution of posttest scores for the 
number of words and the number of cartoons correctly decoded, 
was extremely skewed in a positive direction. Because the 
analysis of variance assumes a normal distribution, a 
transformation of the data was necessary to correct for 
skewness. Winer (19 71) has recommended the use of the 
logarithmic transformation in cases where positive skewness 
is obtained. The number of words and the number of cartoons 
decoded were therefore transformed according to the formula 
given by Winer'(1971, p. 400). 
A multivariate analysis of variance was computed with 
the dependent variables being the transformed scores for the 
number of words and the number of cartoons decoded and the 
scores for the various post-experimental questionnaire items. 
The results of a Hotelling-Lawley1s trace analysis, summarized 
in Table 5 (Appendix F), revealed a nonsignificant main effect 
for reward (approximate F = .75, df_ = 20/142) a significant 
main effect for competency (approximate F = 2.97, df = 20/142, 
£^•0002) a nonsignificant reward x competency interaction 
effect (approximate F = 1.01, df = 40/282). 
A univariate analysis of variance was performed on the 
transformed scores for the number of cartoons correctly 
decoded and revealed no significant differences between groups. 
The results of this analysis are given in Table 6 (Appendix F). 
A univariate analysis of variance performed on the transformed 
scores for the number of words correctly decoded, however, 
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showed an effect for reward which reached signififance at 
£^..0703 (Table 7, Appendix F). No-reward subjects solved 
an average of 61.13 words during the posttest as compared 
to an average of 46.97 for noncontingent-reward subjects and 
an average of 34.17 for contingent-reward subjects. Newman-
Keuls post-hoc tests were performed on the logarithmic 
transformations of the mean scores for reward. None of the 
comparisons reached significance at d^.10. The magnitude 
of effect was computed and indicated that the variable of 
reward accounted for four percent of the total variance and 
the variable of competency and the reward x competency 
•interaction each accounted for zero percent of the total 
variance. 
Another way of looking at the data was to consider the 
following two questions separately: 1) Did the experimental 
manipulations affect the number of persons who subsequently 
chose to engage in the decoding task; and, 2) Did the manipu­
lations affect the performance of those subjects who actually 
engaged in the task during the posttest. The analyses dis­
cussed above, clearly confounded these two questions.. 
In an attempt to answer the first question, a chi-square 
analysis was performed. The number of subjects who engaged 
in the decoding task and the number of subjects who did not 
engage in the decoding task during the posttest, was calculated 
as a function of reward and competency. Because the expected 
cell frequency was less than five in half of the cells, 
the scores were averaged across the competency variable. 
The resulting contingency table is given in Table 8 (Appendix 
F). The results of the chi-square analysis indicated that 
the actual cell frequencies for the reward conditions 
differed from the expected cell frequencies at approximately 
d ^.12 (X_2 = 4.13, df = 2). Separate chi-square comparisons 
were made between contingent-and noncontingent-reward condi­
tions, between contingent-and no-reward conditions and 
between noncontingent—and no-reward conditions. The results 
of these analyses indicated that a significantly greater 
number of subjects chose to work on the posttest cartoons in 
the no-reward condition as compared to the contingent-reward 
condition (X^ = 4.3<4, df = 1, £^.05). The results of the 
chi-square analysis for the comparison between contingent— 
and noncontingent-reward conditions were not significant 
(X^ = .62, df = 1) nor were the results of the analysis for 
the comparison between noncontingent-reward and no-reward 
conditions (X^ = 1.76, df = 1). 
The results of the chi-square analyses suggested that 
there was a tendency for the reward conditions to affect the 
probability that subjects would choose to work on the posttest 
decoding task. In order to answer the second question, i.e. 
"Did the experimental manipulations affect the performance of 
the subjects who shose to work on the posttest decoding task?", 
an unequal N analysis of variance was performed. In this 
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analysis, the number of words and the number of cartoons 
which were decoded during the posttest decoding task were 
analyzed as a function of reward and competency for those 
subjects who actually worked on the posttest task. The 
results of these analyses are given in Tables 9 and 10 
(Appendix F). The results of both analyses revealed no 
significant differences between groups as a function of the 
experimental manipulations. 
Questionnaire Responses 
Subjects were asked to complete two post-experimental 
questionnaires. The first of these was the state anxiety 
subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch £ Lushene, 1968). Subjects were asked to rate their 
feelings "at the moment" on 20 descriptive statements. Each 
of the ratings was on a four-point scale ranging from "not 
at all" to "very much so". Each subject received one score 
based on a total calculated from their answers to the 20 
questions. 
An analysis of variance was performed on the state 
anxiety scores as a function of the experimental manipulations. 
The results of this analysis, shown in Table 11 (Appendix F), 
revealed no significant differences between groups. 
A second post-experimental questionnaire was admini­
stered on which subjects were asked to answer five questions. 
Answers were in the form of ratings which were given on a 10-
point scale. One question asked subjects to rate the extent 
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to which they found working on the decoding task pleasant 
or enjoyable. An analysis of variance was performed on 
these ratings and results indicated no significant differences 
between groups (Table 12, Appendix F). 
The results of an analysis of variance computed for 
ratings of the amount of time subjects estimated that they 
spent working on the posttest decoding task revealed an 
effect for reward significant at d<.1209 (F = 2.15, df = 2/81). 
The means for ratings of time spent paralleled the results 
of the analysis for the number of words decoded. The mean 
rating for contingent-reward subjects was 4.30 and the mean 
rating for noncontingent-reward subjects was 5.13 and the 
mean rating for no-reward subjects was 7.37. 
An analysis of variance was computed for subjects' 
ratings of how humorous they felt the cartoons were. The 
results of this analysis, shown in Table 14 (Appendix F), 
indicated no significant differences between groups. 
An analysis of variance was also performed on subjects' 
ratings of how likely they felt they would be to volunteer for 
a similar experiment in the future. The results of this 
analysis are given in Table 15 (Appendix F) and indicate a 
main effect for competency which is significant at p <(.10 
(F = 2.31, df = 2/81). Mean ratings for low-competence, 
average-competence and high-competence subjects were 6.47, 
7.80 and 9.73, respectively. 
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As a check on the competency manipulation, subjects 
were asked to rate their ability for the decoding task. 
An analysis of variance performed on these ratings (Table 
16, Appendix F) revealed a significant main, effect for 
competency (F = 16.18, df =2 . 81, g_<.001). It is this result 
which in major part ; accounted for the significant main 
effect for competency in the multivariate analysis discussed 
previously.2 Mewman-Keuls post-hoc tests were performed 
and revealed that low-competency subjects gave significantly 
lower ratings of their ability as compared to high-competency 
subjects' ratings (jĵ .01) and significantly lower ratings 
as compared to average-competency subjects (p^.05). There 
was no significant difference between average-competency 




It was predicted that the various conditions of reward 
would result in differences in subsequent task interest 
between subjects. With respect to no-reward subjects, the 
prediction was straight-forward; these subjects were expected 
to demonstrate greater interest in the posttest decoding 
task as compared to subjects in the contingent-and non-
contingent -reward conditions. Differences between contingent-
and noncontingent-reward subjects, could have been in either 
direction. On the basis of Lepper and Greene's (1975) 
information-processing model, contingent reward should have 
resulted in greater subsequent task interest to the extent 
that this procedure directed attention towards the subgoals 
necessary for successful task performance. However, the 
possibility was also suggested that contingent reward might 
result in lesser task interest as compared to noncontingent 
reward because the former procedure might call greater 
attention to the fact that the subject's behavior was under 
the control of the reward. 
Hypothesis 1 made the prediction that contingent reward 
would result in the least amount of subsequent task interest. 
It was further predicted that noncontingent.reward would 
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result in relatively greater subsequent task interest and 
that no-reward would yield the greatest amount of interest 
in the posttest decoding task. The results of the experiment 
were in the direction predicted by the hypothesis*, however, 
the findings were not sufficiently strong to reach convention­
al levels of significance. The trend emerged only for the 
dependent variable of number of words correctly decoded. As 
it turned out, the number of cartoons correctly decoded was 
not a sensitive enough measure to reflect differences. The 
analyses conducted suggested that reward exerted its effect 
primarily by influencing the probability with which subjects 
chose to engage in the posttest decoding test. Once an 
individual had chosen to engage in the task; the various 
conditions of reward had no significant influence. The 
hypothesis that contingent reward, as compared to noncontin­
gent or no^reward, brings into greater focus the perception 
that one's behavior is under the control of external mands, 
received only modest support from the test results. 
It should be noted that subjects in the three reward 
groups did not differ significantly in the number of words 
decoded during the treatment phase of the experiment. It 
might be argued that the contingent-reward procedure did not 
direct attention towards task subgoals to any greater degree 
than did the other rew'ard conditions. This might be true since 
the performance of contingent-reward subjects was not signifi­
cantly better than the performance of noncontingent-reward 
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and no-reward subjects during treatment. Perhaps under 
conditions in which contingent reward leads to improved 
task performance, the effect of this type of reward 
procedure upon subsequent task interest may be less detrimental. 
The results of questionnaire data asking subjects to 
rate the amount of time spent on the posttest task, paralleled 
the behavioral data. However, other questionnaire data, 
dealing with the subjects' evaluations of the task, revealed 
no significant findings. That is, there were no differences 
between subjects' ratings of how pleasant or enjoyable they 
found the task, how humorous they felt the cartoons were or how 
likely they would be to volunteer for a similar experiment 
in the future. Self-perception theory would predict that 
subjects would infer that a task was endowed with a greater 
percentage of tact elements if they engaged in the task with 
no apparent incentive. The results of task evaluation 
questionnaire data, therefore, should have paralleled the 
behavioral data according to the self-perception hypothesis. 
This was not, however, the case. 
One factor which may account for the weakness of the 
obtained effect, has been discussed by McGraw (1976). Reward 
may exert detrimental effects in two ways', i.ev it may inter­
fere with ongoing performance and/or it may effect subsequent 
task interest. After reviewing the literature on the detri­
mental effects of reward upon performance, McGraw concluded 
that incentives are detrimental to ongoing performance when 
two conditions are met. The first of these concerns the 
attractiveness of the task and holds that the task must be 
inherently interesting so that the offer of incentives is a 
superfluous source of motivation. Recall that Calder and 
Staw (1975) suggested that the same condition be met before 
reward would have a detrimental effect upon subsequent task 
interest. The second condition requires that the solution 
to the task be open-ended and that the steps leading to the 
solution not be immediately obvious. That is, the detrimental 
effects of reward increase as the solutions become more 
heuristic and less algorithmic. 
An algorithmic problem is one whose solution is readily 
obtainable by following a prescribed set of operations. 
Simple mathematical calculations such as addition, subtraction, 
division, etc., are examples of algorithmic problems. 
Heuristic problems, on the other hand, are problems in which 
solutions are not readily obtainable by following any one 
systematic plan. In heuristic problem solving, an individual 
proceeds according to a number of loosely constructed plans or 
strategies. In a chess game, for example, it would be 
inefficient for players to judge each of their moves according to 
an algorithmic procedure in which all possible moves were 
tried. Instead, they adopt a number of heuristic strategies 
such as "protect the king", "control the center of the board", 
etc. 
A number of heuristic tasks have been used to study 
the detrimental effects of reward upon performance. 
Kruglanski, Friedman and Zeevi (1971), for example, asked 
fifth-grade school children to supply as many titles as 
possible to a literary paragraph and to compose a story from 
a list of fifty words which they had been given. Glucksberg 
(1962) asked subjects to solve a "functional-fixedness" 
problem involving a candle, a box of thumbtacks and' a book 
of matches. The subject's job was to mount the candle on a 
vertical screen. The solution required that the subject 
empty, the box of thumbtacks and use the container as a 
platform on which to hold the candle. McGraw (1976) 
has reported that he and McCullers have employed a series 
of water-jug problems in which all but the last problem 
is solvable in a single way by a well-defined rule. The 
last problem has a novel solution and thus requires the 
subject to adopt a heuristic strategy. 
The results of these investigations of heuristic 
problem solving, indicated that reward had a detrimental 
effect upon performance. On the other hand, McGraw (19 76) 
reported that studies have indicated that reward may have 
a facilitative effect upon performance when the task is an 
algorithmic one such as mental multiplication (e.g. Weinstein, 
1971a, 1971b, and 1972) or serial learning of geometric forms 
(e.g., Dornbush, 1955; Bahrick, 1954). 
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The algorithmic-heuristic task dimension has been 
shown to be of importance in predicting the detrimental effects 
of reward upon performance. The dimension may also have 
parallel importance in the area of reward's effect upon 
subsequent task interest. A reconsideration of the literature 
in this area, reveals that heuristic problems have been used 
in the majority of experimental investigations. Deci's 
(1971, 1972) investigations employed Soma puzzles and headline 
writing as experimental problems. Lepper, Greene and Nisbett's 
(197 3) experimental task was drawing with Magic Markers and 
Ross (1975) employed drum playing as his experimental 
activity. All of these tasks are heuristic in nature and in 
all cases, reward was found to have detrimental effects upon 
subsequent task interest. 
On the other hand, a task used by Reiss and Sushinsky 
(19 75a) was algorithmic and when children were rewarded for 
engaging in the task, subsequent task interest increased. 
The task was listening to one of three songs and subjects were 
rewarded on a contingent basis for their performance. 
On the basis of the studies reviewed, it would seem that 
the algorithmic-heuristic dimension may have a parallel 
application in the area of reward's effect upon subsequent 
task interest. In relation to the present investigation, 
the application is straight-forward. Although the decoding 
task was one which was seemingly high in attractiveness and 
intrinsic interest, it was also one which required algorithmic 
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solutions. While the effect of reward upon an attractive 
task is to reduce subsequent interest, the effect of reward 
upon an algorithmic task may be to increase subsequent 
interest. The interaction of these two effects may have 
resulted in a tendency towards neutralization. The algorithmic 
quality of the task may have functioned to counteract the 
detrimental effects of the reward. 
In an attempt to identify the mechanisms behind reward's 
detrimental effect upon heuristic problem-solving behavior, 
McGraw (19 76) entered into a discussion of the incidental 
learning-literature. In these studies, an individual is 
required to engage in one learning task, and subsequently, 
performance is measured on a secondary or incidental task. 
The incidental material may be spatially separate or contiguous 
to the intentional stimuli which are part of the primary 
task. Bahrick, Fitts, and Rankin (19 54), for example, had 
subjects engage in a tracking task during which time a 
sequence of lights flashed in the periphery of the visual 
field for unexpected five-second durations. Subjects who 
were rewarded for their tracking performance scored fewer points 
on the incidental task (recalling the sequence of lights which 
flashed in the peripheral field) compared to subjects who were 
not rewarded for tracking. Other studies reviewed by McGraw 
have also provided support for the notion that reward is 
detrimental to incidental associations which are both spa­
tially separate and contiguous. 
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McGraw has suggested that rewarded subjects do less 
well on heuristic tasks because of their inferiority at 
incidental learning. He argues that solutions to heuristic 
tasks require attention to cognitively or perceptually 
peripheral events. McGraw seems to be saying that reward 
tends to increase the selectivity of one's attention and 
focuses it upon the central events of the task. It is for 
this reason, therefore, that reward is detrimental to heuristic 
problem solving. On the other hand, in algorithmic problems, 
it is useful to focus attention upon a restricted set of 
operations. Therefore, under these conditions, reward may 
function as a facilitator. 
McGraw's hypothesis amounts to a competing response 
explanation of the data. The suggestion is that reward 
engenders behavior which is incompatible with the behavior 
required for adequate performance on heuristically•oriented 
problems. It is possible to apply this model to situations 
in which we are dealing with subsequent task interest. In 
such cases, one might reason that subjects subsequently 
engage in heuristic problems to a lesser extent because 
during training they learned fewer problem-solving strategies 
than did unrewarded subjects. Heuristic problems are less 
interesting to rewarded subjects simply because they may 
have less success with them. 
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One problem with this argument, however, is that it 
is possible to get a decreased play effect when no differences 
are present between groups during training- Deci (1971), 
for example, actually found a non-significant increase in 
performance during training for reward subjects. Weiner 
and Mander (1975) found no differences between subjects in 
performance on an anagram task in their study of the effects 
of punishment upon subsequent task interest. Differences 
were reported between subjects' performance in Lepper, 
Greene and Nisbett's (19 73) investigation. In that study, 
expected-reward subjects drew significantly poorer quality 
drawing (as judged by independent raters) when compared to 
drawings made by unexpected-reward and no-reward subjects. 
The point, however, is that the connection between poor task 
performance and subsequent task interest is not always readily 
apparent. Subsequent task interest, in some instances at 
least, appears to decrease in the absence of any performance 
deficit during training. 
An alternative explanation of why the heuristic dimension 
is important in determining the effect of reward upon subse­
quent task interest is consistent with self-perception theory. 
It is necessary to assume, first of all, that there has, in 
past research, been a correlation between heuristics and task 
attraction. In the research conducted thus far, the heuristic 
problems have been ones which have been higher in attractiveness. 
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Although a positive correlation between the dimension of attrac­
tiveness and heuristics is not a necessary condition, it may 
be more often true than not. Indeed, it is possible for a 
task to be heuristic and unattractive. Imagine, for example, 
an unfortunate soldier's task of escaping from behind enemy' 
lines. Also, there may be some individual differences regard­
ing the relative attractiveness of heuristics. For example, 
subjects from lower socio-economic backgrounds may find 
heuristic problems relatively less attractive because of a 
past history of failure with such problems (Spence, 19 70). 
However, in research conducted so far, heuristic problems seem 
to have been more attractive than algorithmic ones. Perhaps 
heuristic problems are especially attractive because they 
are novel and invoke novel solutions. Under conditions of 
high task attractiveness, the tact elements of the situation 
predominate and so the introduction of mand elements may be 
especially noticable. Under these conditions, an individual 
is likely to assign greater importance to the mand elements 
and infer that his behavior is, to a greater extent than is 
perhaps true, under the control of these elements. Kelly's 
(1973) "discounting principle" would seem to apply here. This 
principle is a part of Kelly's attribution theory and states 
that the role of a given cause in producing an effect is 
discounted when other plausible causes are present. Thus, 
under conditions when mand elements are perceived to predominate, 
tact elements are discounted as likely causes of behavior. 
Subsequent task behavior is, therefore, likely to decrease. 
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Conversely, under conditions of low task attractiveness, 
mand elements typically predominate. In this case, the 
introduction of tact elements are more perceptible than they 
would be if the proportion of mand and tact elements were 
more equally balanced. The subject, therefore, infers 
that the behavior is under the control of these tact elements 
and his subsequent task interest increases. This is the 
situation which occurs in most dissonance experiments. The 
self-perception hypothesis proposed here is, of course, 
testable and is offered in the interest of stimulating further 
research. 
In the present experiment, subjects were administered 
the state-anxiety subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory. The scale was administered as a check on the 
possibility that the detrimental effects of reward were due 
to an emotional effect induced by the termination of reward. 
Such an emotional effect would most likely be short-lived and 
would not be of considerable theoretical or practical impor­
tance. The fact that there were no differences between 
subjects on this dimension does not necessarily rule out the 
possibility of a short-term emotional effect. It is possible 
that such an effect might have been dissipated during the 
posttest and, therefore, may not have made itself evident on 
the anxiety subscale. The question of temporary emotional 
effects is one which should be addressed in future research. 
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The present experiment revealed no significant main 
effect for competency. Hypothesis 2, therefore, was not 
confirmed. The results of questionnaire data, however, seemed 
to indicate that the manipulation was for"the most part 
successful. Low-competency subjects rated their ability as 
significantly lower than average and high-competency subjects. 
The difference between average-competency and high-competency 
subjects, however, did not reach significance. It is 
possible that subjects did not attribute much importance to 
their perceived competence or incompetence. If subjects had 
been informed that the task was correlated with indices of 
intelligence., the competency manipulation may have been more 
effective. 
It is also possible that there were individual differ­
ences with respect to subjects' reactions to this manipulation. 
That is, some subjects may have been intimidated by the per­
ception of low-competence and others challenged by it. 
Similarly, some subjects may have been "spurred-on" by per­
ceptions of high-^competence while others may have perceived 
the high-competence instructions as an indication that the 
task had been "conquered" and further efforts to test their 
capabilities were unnecessary. Once again, this is an issue 
which should be dealt with in future research. 
Finally, hypothesis 3 predicted a significant interaction 
between conditions of reward and competency. It was predicted 
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that the detrimental effects of contingent•reward would be 
offset by the perception of high.competency and the beneficial 
effects of no-'reward would be offset by the perception of 
low competency. This prediction was not substantiated 
because of the fact that a competency effect was not obtained. 
In summary, the results of the present investigation 
revealed a trend in which contingent reward resulted in a 
detrimental effect upon subsequent task interest when compared 
to a no-reward procedure. Noncontingent^reward also resulted 
in decreases in subsequent task interesthowever, these 
decreases were not as severe as those demonstrated by the 
contingent-reward procedure. Although the main effect for 
reward did not reach conventional levels of significance, the 
results were suggestive and the problem is deserving of 
further experimental evaluation. 
One area in which future research should be aimed is 
toward the algorithmic-heuristic dimension of the experimental 
task. One important question with regard to this issue has to 
do with the reasons for reward's differential effect upon these 
two types of problems. One question which has been raised, 
is the following: "Is the differential effect of reward due 
simply to differences in task attractiveness, or is the 
differential effect due to reward's tendency to engender 
responses which are compatible or incompatible with ongoing 
behavior?". 
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The variable of perceived competence in the present 
investigation had no significant effect upon subsequent task 
interest. Several explanations of this findingj have been 
offered. Future research might employ a competency manipulation 
which might encourage a more general sense of mastery. In 
addition, future research should carefully examine individual 
differences with respect to the variable of perceived 
competence. 
Finally, one other important issue concerns the per­
manence of the decreased play effect. Reiss and Shusinsky 
(1975a, 1975b) have suggested that reductions in subsequent 
task interest may in some cases be due to a temporary 
emotional effect due to the withdrawal of reward. The propo­
sition that the decreased play effect is due to a generalized 
emotional arousal, has not as yet received proper experimental 
evaluation. This is another issue, therefore, which is 
worthy of further research. 
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FOOTNOTES 
•^•Seligman (197 5) has suggested that noncontingent 
reward may lead to learned helplessness since helplessness 
is said to occur whenever there is independence between 
behavior and outcome. It should be noted that noncontingent 
reward subjects in the present investigation, however, had 
control over whether or not they received reward. That is, 
the reward was contingent upon the subjects1 participation 
rather than upon their performance. Therefore, to receive 
their reward, noncontingent-reward subjects merely needed 
to continue to participate in the experiment. Since respons 
outcome independence did not occur in the present study, one 
would not expect that "learned helplessness" would effect 
the results. 
^Inspection of the canonical correlations indicated 
that the dependent variable of subjects' ratings of their 
ability correlated .73 with the first cononical variable. 
The first cononical variable in a multivariate analysis of 
variance is a composite score composed of weighted scores 
(discriminant function scores) for all dependent variables 
in the analysis. A correlation of .73 indicates that the 
dependent variable of subjects' rated ability accounted for 
approximately 50% of the variance for the main effect of 




Code 1. To break this code, divide the word in half, write 
the first half backwards and then write the second half 
backwards. 
For example: the word first would look like iftsr. '• 
Code 2. To break code 2, put the last letter of the word at 
the beginning and reverse the order of the remaining pairs 
of letters. 
For example: .the word first would look like ritsf. 
Code 3. To break this code, divide the word in half, write 
the second half of the letters with wide spaces in between 
them, write the first half below the letters corresponding to 
spaces above, and combine the two. 
For example: the word first would look like isfrt." To 
decode it: f v t (space around second half) 
i s (insert first half) 
"You should note that with codes 1 and 3, if the word has an 
uneven number of letters, as in the example, the second half 
of the word will always have the extra letter. 
APPENDIX B 
SUBJECT RESPONSE SHEET 
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The experiment you are about to participate in is one 
in a series of preliminary investigations designed to study 
problem-solving behavior. We are currently attempting to 
evaluate the appropriateness of a decoding task for use in 
future experimentation. Specifically, the task you will be 
working with today is a decoding exercise in which you will 
be required to decode the captions for a series of cartoons. 
Directly in front of you is a code key, describing three 
codes and providing an example of each. The codes require 
manipulation of the letters as shown on the code key. Your 
task, very simply, will be to break the code of the cartoon 
captions and decipher the words so that the captions make 
sense. Actually, each caption has been divided into three 
groups of words and each group uses a different code. Each 
cartoon caption, therefore, will require-the use of all three 
codes for complete decodification. The order in which the 
codes are used is of importance and you should attend to the 
particular sequence of code usage within each caption. For 
example: a particular caption may be decoded using code 1, 
followed by code 2 and followed finally by code 3. This 
then would be a 1,2,3 sequence. Sequences may be arranged 
in other orders as well', for example, 321 might be another sequence. 
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Before the start of the experiment, I will randomly select 
a collection of cartoons for you to decode. The collection 
will be composed of 12 cartoons arranged in three equal 
groups. V7ithin each group of four cartoons, the code sequences 
are arranged in a systematic fashion. If you can determine 
the principle behind the code sequences, you will be able 
to decipher the captions more quickly as you will not have to 
rely upon a trial and error process of code selection. The 
principle will be the same for all three groups of cartoons 
so that once you discover the principle, it will apply for all 
remaining groups. If you do not determine the sequence 
pattern, however, you can still solve the captions by trying 
the codes in trial and error fashion but this will take you 
slightly longer. During the task, you are allowed to use the 
code key and the scratch paper on the table. Before beginning 
the actual task, it would probably be helpful for you to 
practice with a sample cartoon. Before giving you this, how­
ever, I should like to point out that some of the cartoons 
deal with sexual material and if you find this objectionable 
and would like to withdraw from the experiment now or at any 
time, you are perfectly free to do so. You will receive your 






DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used 
to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement 
and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at 
this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any one statement, but give the 
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
l=not at all 3=moderately so 
2=somewhat 4=very much so 
1. I feel 2 3 4 
2. I feel secure . .1 2 3 4 
3. I am tense . .1 2 3 4 
4. I am ri sgretful . .1 2 3 4 
5. I feel at•ease . .1 2 3 4 
6. I feel upset . .1 2 3 4 
7. I am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes . .1 2 3 4 
8. I feel rested . .1 2 3 4 




I feel comfortable . .1 2 3 4 
11. I feel self-confident . .1 2 3 4 
12 . I feel nervous 2 3 4 
13. I am j ittery . .1 2 3 4 
14. I feel "high strung" . .1 2 3 4 
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15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16. I feel content 1 2 3 4 
17. I am worried 1 2 3 4 
18. I feel over-excited and "rattled" 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel joyful 1 2 3 4 





On some of the questions below, you will be asked to give 
ratings on a ten point scale. The scale will look like this: 
/ / / / / / / / / /  
You are to circle the line which most represents how you 
feel. For example, if you were asked to rate how clearly 
the experimenter explained the task and you felt she explained 
it very clearly, you would circle the 10th line. 
very unclearly / ' / / / / /  /  /  /  ( J )  very clearly 
Please circle the lines only, not the spaces between lines. 
1) Rate the extent to which you found working on the decoding 
task pleasant or enjoyable. 
extremely extremely 
u n e n j o y a b l e  / / / / / / / / / /  enjoyable 
2) Rate the amount of time that you spent working on the 
cartoons of collection 2 during the time when the experimenter 
was absent from the laboratory. 
none of the all of the 
time / / / / / / / / / /  time 
3) Rate your ability for the decoding task. 
very low very high 
a b i l i t y  / / / / / / / / / /  a b i l i t y  
4) Did you find the cartoons humorous? 
none all 
of them II t II II ! II of them 
5) How likely would you be to volunteer for a similar 
experiment in the future? 
very very 
u n l i k e l y  / / / / / / / / / /  l i k e l y  
6) Had you ever seen any of the cartoons used in this 
study before today? How many? 
7) Did you know anything about this experiment before 
participating? Explain. 




Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Number 
of VJords Decoded During the Treatment 
Phase of the Experiment 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 17. 622 2 8. 811 .01 
Competency 388. ,022 2 194 . 011 .23 
Reward x Competency 3392. .044 4 848 , .011 1.01 
Error 67835. 600 81 837, .477 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Number of 
Cartoons Decoded During the Treatment 
Phase of the Experiment 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 5.422 2 2.711 .98 
Competency 7.222 2 3.611 .50 
Reward x Competency 22.244 4 5 .561 . 81 
Error 586.100 81 7 .236 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 3 
Mean Number of VJords Decoded During the Posttest as a 
Function of Reward and Competency 
Low- Average- High-
Competency Competency Competency 
Contingent-
Reward 25.5 32 .5 44 .5 
Noncontingent-
Reward 38.9 49.3 52.7 
No-Reward 5 0.4 77.2 55.8 
X = 38.27 53.00 51.00 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 4 
Mean Number of Cartoons Decoded During the Posttest as a 
Function of Reward and Competency 
Low- Average- High- xl 
Competency Competency Competency H 
Contingent-
Reward 1.70 3.00 3.10 
Noncontingent-







X=. 2.63 H.13 3TIT7 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 5 
Hotelling-Lawley1s Trace Multivariate Analysis 
of Variance Summary Table 
Approximate 
Source S M N df F 
Reward 2 3.5 35.0 20/142 .75 
Competency 2 3.5 35.0 20/142 2.97* 




Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Logarithmic 
Transformation of the Number of Cartoons Decoded During 
the Posttest Phase of the Experiment 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward .'(675 2 .2338 1.1847 
Competency . 3677 2 .1839 .9141 
Reward x Competency . 3024 4 .0756 . 3759 
Error 16.2889 81 .2011 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 7 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Logarithmic 
Transformation of the Number of Words Decoded 
During the Posttest Phase of the Experiment 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 4. 829 2 2 .415 2.72* 
Competency 1.216 2 .608 .68 
Reward x Competency 2.371 i+ .593 ,67 




Chi-Square Contingency Table for Number of Subjects Choosing to 
Work on Cartoons During the Posttest 
Contingent- Noncontingent-
Reward Reward No-Reward 
Subjects choosing 
to work on cartoons 
EF=16.67 






choosing to work EF=13.33 EF=13.3 3 EF=13.33 
on cartoons AF=17.00 AF=1M.00 AF= 9.00 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 9 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Number of Words Decoded 
During the Posttest by Subjects who Chose to 
Work on the Decoding Task 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 756 . 3759 2 378.1080 .24 
Competency 1305.5988 2 652 .7994 .42 
Reward x Competency 4571.2774 4 1142.8194 .74 
Error 63522.1619 81 1549.3210 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 10 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Number of Cartoons 
Decoded During the Posttest by Subjects who chose to work 
on the Decoding Task 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 2.1269 2 2.0635 .09 
Competency 23.6322 2 11.8161 1.01 
Reward x Competency 55 . 295i( 4 13.8239 1.18 
Error 478.7750 81 11.67 711 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 11 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Subjects^ Ratings on the 





















Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Subjects' ratings of the 
extent to which they found working on the decoding 
task pleasant or enjoyable 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 130. 7556 2 65 , . 3778 .84 
Competency 236 . ,0222 2 118 , .0111 1.51 
Reward x Competency 386. 2444 4 96 , .5611 1.24 
Error 6331. .3000 81 78, .1642 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 13 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Subjects' Ratings of the amount 
of Time They Spent Working on the Decoding Task During the Posttest 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 208.8667 2 104 .4334 2.15* 
Competency 62.6000 2 31.3000 .64 
Reward x Competency 39.7333 4 9.9333 .20 












Source SS df MS F 
Reward 7.6222 2 3 .8111 .57 
Competency 6.1556 2 3 .0778 .46 
Reward x Competency 13.6444 4 3 .4111 .51 
Error 545.3000 81 6 .7321 
APPENDIX F 
TABLE 15 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Subjects' Ratings of How 
Likely They Would be to Volunteer for a Similar 
Experiment in the Future 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 62.0667 2 31i 0 3 34 .89 
Competency 161.8667 2 80.9333 2. 31* 










Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Subjects' Ratings of 
Their Ability for the Decoding Task 
Source SS df MS F 
Reward 
Competency 
Reward x Competency 
Error 
3.8889 
107.0889 
17.6444 
268.0000 
2 
2 
4 
81 
1.944 4 
5 3.5444 
4.4111 
3.3086 
.59 
16.18* 
1.33 
<.0001 
